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THE POWER OF A COURT OF EQUITY TO GIVE
RELIEF FROM DECREES OF THE
PROBATE COURT
GEORGE S. STANSELL

"-NE seldom, if ever, nowadays, hears of the filing
O
of a bill in equity for relief against a will for fraud
after the statutory period for contest has elapsed. Certainly the appearance of such cases in the courts of last
resort is extremely rare. Whether this is because the
world is becoming better, or the lawyer more careful,
cannot be positively asserted. It is to be doubted if either
suggestion furnishes the correct explanation. In view of
the comparatively short statutes of limitations upon appeals and contests from probate, seldom more than a
year, and in some jurisdictions as short as six months,
it seems likely that there is a genuine need for such a
remedy. It seems probable that the correct explanation
lies in the general belief prevalent among lawyers and
commentators that such a remedy does not exist, and the
resulting reluctance to attempt untrodden paths. It is
the purpose here to investigate the fallacies underlying
this belief, and to demonstrate under what circumstances
such relief may be granted, and what form such relief
should take.
In approaching the principal question, that of jurisdiction, one must remember that the testament, as we know
it, and the procedure of probate, was developed not in
the common law courts but in the ecclesiastical courts
administering the cannon law. The will, which took
form as a testament pro salute animae, was never with-
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drawn from the regulation and control of these courts.
Glanvil tells us that in his day jurisdiction in cases of
disputed wills belonged to the ecclesiastical courts.1 Selden states that during the reign of Henry II, with its
incessant struggle between church and state, no-claim
to such jurisdiction was ever made by the king's courts.2
Holdsworth pointedly observes: "Once admit that the
ecclesiastical courts have jurisdiction to decide cases of
disputed wills, and a jurisdiction to grant probate will
soon follow. "3 It did follow. The statute of Circumspecte
agatis,4 and the. more important one of Articuli cleri,5
although in most respects settling the struggle for jurisdiction in favor of the king's courts, and limiting the
powers of the ecclesiastical courts, nevertheless abandoned entirely and absolutely to the ecclesiastical courts
and intestate succesall jurisdiction over testamentary
6
property.
personal
to
sion
However, as late as the eighteenth century the power
of a court of chancery to set aside wills fraudulently
obtained was still an open question. In 1664, in Roberts
v. Wynn,7 the court of chancery, although confessing
itself greatly moved by the equities and justice of a bill
for relief against a fraudulently obtained will, despite its
having retained jurisdiction for some time in the hope of
granting relief, and even though bidden by the House
of Lords to render justice in the matter regardless of
precedent, dismissed the bill, because it was unable to find
precedent for relief and was unwilling to create one.
This case makes no mention of a decision rendered twentyfive years earlier, in which the court of chancery, in passing upon the validity of a will of land, attacked on the
ground of undue influence and fraud, without stating the
nature of the relief sought or given, declared itself to be
1 VII, 8. Placitum de testamentis coram judice ecclesiastico.
2

Original of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction of Testaments, Chap. 1.

8 History of English Law, I, 625.

4 13 Edward I, St. 4.
5 9 Edward II, St. 1.
6 Holdsworth, op. cit., 587.
7 1 Ch. Rep. 236, 21 Eng. Rep. 560 (1664).
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"of opinion that the said will was a very inofficious will,
seeking to prefer strangers before name and blood."I
In 1700 the court declared that a will as well as a deed
might be set aside for fraud and circumvention.' In 1715
the court held that a will though valid at law might be
set aside in equity.'0 In 1725, however, the court held that
there was a "difference betwixt a deed and a will gained
from a weak man and upon misrepresentation or fraud;
for if a will be gained from a weak man, and by false
representation, this is not a sufficient reason to set it
aside in equity . . . but where a deed (which is not revocable as a will) is gained from a weak man upon a
misrepresentation and without any valuable consideration, the same ought to be set aside in equity. ,11
The question was ultimately settled by the House of
Lords in 1727 in the case of Kerrich v. Bransby.12 The
rule was laid down that a court of equity may not entertain jurisdiction of a bill to set aside a will or the probate
thereof. The reason assigned was the sufficiency of the
relief available in the probate court in matters of personal property, and in the law courts in matters of real
property. Justice McLean of the United States Supreme
Court, in a leading case, 8 comments upon the position
taken as follows:
SMaundy v. Maundy, 1 Ch. Rep. 123, 21 Eng Rep. 526 (1639).
OWelby v. Thornagh, Prec. Ch. 123, 24 Eng. Rep. 59 (1700): "The Court
was clear of opinion, that a will as well as a deed may be set aside in this
court for fraud and circumvention, but that no such thing was made out in this
case; but the heir insisting on it, it was directed to an issue divisavit vel
non, and the bills to be retained in the meantime ...."
10 Goss v. Tracy, 1 P. Wins. 287, 24 Eng. Rep. 392 (1725): "In like manner,
if A had devised his lands to his mother in fee, and afterwards J. S. the defendant, had told A the testator, and not the mother (as in the principal
case), that the will was a void will for want of its being well guarded; and
that he would make another will for the testator, that should be effectually
guarded; and accordingly he had made another will for the testator, whereby
the estate had been devised to the mother for life only, the remainder to J. S.
(the defendant) in fee; this would be a good will in law, if attested pursuant
to the act of parliament, but would be set aside in equity for the fraud; but
as to the evidence of the testator's being non compos, that is entirely at law,
and to be tried there."
11James v. Greaves, 2 P. Wins. 270, 24 Eng. Rep. 726 (1725).
12 7 Bro. P. C. 437, 3 Eng. Rep. 284 (1727).
13 Gaines v. Chew, 43 U. S. (2 How.) 619, 11 L. Ed. 402 (1844).

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

In cases of fraud, equity has a concurrent jurisdiction with
a court of law, but in regard to a will charged to have been obtained through fraud, this rule does not hold. It may be difficult
to assign any very satisfactory reason for this exception. That
exclusive jurisdiction over the probate of wills is vested in another tribunal is the only one that can be given.

Nothing seems more axiomatic in the law today than
that the jurisdiction of the probate court is of exclusive
character.14 There is not a single modern case which
denies this principle. Almost without exception the decisions acquiesce in it as fundamental, even though the
relief rendered in some of the cases may seem in effect
to reduce such acquiescense to lip service only.
To this general rule there are certain well recognized
exceptions. 15 Courts and commentators alike agree that
equity may give relief where fraud has prevented a will
from being made,1 6 or where the revocation of a will has
been prevented by fraud, 7 or where a name is inserted
fraudulently in a will in place of the intended devisee or
legatee,' or where a devisee or legatee takes the prop14 No account is taken here, of course, of statutory nroceedings in equity in
the nature of will contests or appeals from probate. For the purposes of the
present discussion, probate proceeding may be considered as embracing not
only probate proper, but also such supplementary equitable machinery as
statute may provide. Until all such has been exhausted, there is no need of
equitable relief in the sense used in this paper.
15 Perry, Trusts and Trustees (7th ed., 1929), sec. 182.
16 Nannev v. Williams. 22 Beav. 451, 52 Eng. Rep. 1182 (1856); Dowd v.
Tucker, 41 Conn. 197 (1874) ; Williams v. Fitch, 18 N. Y. 546 (1859). Williams
v. Fitch is an action of assumpsit at law, and not in equity. There the court
held that where the trustee of a fund to which be would succeed in case of
intestacy prevents the making of a will in favor of a third party by promising
to hold the fund for the benefit of the intended legatee, the latter may recover
its value as money had and received to his use.
17 Dowd v. Tucker, 41 Conn. 197 (1874). In this case an aunt of the resnondent, with whom she lived and to whom by her will she had given all her
property, upon her death bed desired to change her will, and give a certain
piece of real estate to a niece, and had a codicil prepared for that purpose.
Before signing the codicil she wished to secure the consent of the respondent
to the change and had him called in for that purpose. After hearing her,
he replied that she was weak and that she need not trouble herself to sign
the codicil, but that he would deed the property to the niece and carry out
her wishes. After her death the respondent refused to convey to the niece.
Equity held him a trustee for the niece.
18 Marriot v. Marriot, 1 Str. 666, 93 Eng. Rep. 770 (1725).
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erty charged with an oral trust, 19 or where the fraud in
respect to the will is merely part of a course of fraud
which comes within the purvey of equity upon independent grounds.2 0
There is, however, another group of cases, more important than any of those enumerated, in which equity
may grant relief-those in which a will is probated by
accident or mistake, or the probate is procured by fraud.
In respect to the availability of equitable relief in these
cases, the decisions and authorities are not in accord.
Certain distinguished writers upon the subject appear
either not to have appreciated fully the doctrine of the
English case! of Barnesly v. Powel,2 ' or to have assumed
that its principle has been swept away by the cases
enunciating the general rule.22
It is with this important group of cases which follows
the doctrine first pronounced in Barnesly v. Powel that
the present paper is principally intended to deal. Since
the cases in which a will is probated through accident or
mistake are rare as compared with those in which probate has been obtained by fraud, and since the circumstances in the former type of case are by their nature
more likely to admit of review in the same court than are
those in the latter, the first class will be disregarded and
attention concentrated on a consideration of those cases
where probate has been obtained by fraud." The general
19 Church v. Ruland, 64 Pa. St. 432 (1870) ; Williams v. Vreeland, 29 N. J.
Eq. 417 (1878); Dowd v. Tucker, 41 Conn. 197 (1874) ; Williams v. Fitch, 18
N. Y. 546 (1859).
20 Nanney v. Williams, 22 Beav. 52 (1856); Sumner v. Staton, 151 N. C.
198, 65 S. E. 902 (1909). In Sumner v. Staton, the court held that, where the
grantee in deeds procured by fraud was also the sole residuary legatee and
executor under a will procured by the same means to fortify his title, a court
of equity had complete power to annul the deeds and declare him a trustee
for the testator's next of kin, since a proceeding to contest the will could not
cancel the deeds and give complete relief.
211 Ves. Sr. 284, 27 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1749).
22 Perry, op. cit., sec. 182; Joseph Warren, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 309 (1928), and
cases cited.
23 For an interesting case of equitable relief against a decree of distribution
ordered by mistake, see In re Walker's Estate, 160 Cal. 547, 117 P. 510, 36
L. R. A. (N. S.) 89 (1911). Justice Henshaw, delivering the majority opinion
said: "The sanctity and immunity of a decree of distribution which has become final attaches to the decree itself, and not to those who under it may
have derived an unconscionable advantage through fraud, accident, or mistake.
Such questions the probate court does not possess the requisite machinery
to try."
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principle of this group of cases is stated by Mr. Pomeroy:
"Where a probate is obtained by fraud, equity may declare the executor or the other person deriving
title under
24
it, a trustee for the party defrauded."
The decision in Barnesly v. Powel was handed down by
Lord Hardwicke in the Court of Chancery in 1749. The
casei has. been much cited, its facts frequently misstated,2 5
and its principles often misunderstood. It is, therefore
fitting that it should be stated at some length.
Barnesly filed a bill in equity against Powel and another to obtain relief against the probate of a forged
will, under which the defendant Powel was named as
executor. Barnesly, a man of weak mind and will, subsequently adjudged a lunatic, was next of kin of the deceased. Powel induced Barnesly to execute a deed agreeing to do whatsoever Powel might require of him in
respect to the decedent's estate. By means of this deed
and through fraud and imposition Powel induced
Barnesly to sign a proxy consenting to the probate of the
forged will. 'The estate consisted of both realty and personalty. Barnesly had already determined the title to the
realty at law in an action of ejectment, in which the jury
found the will a forgery, and declared title in him. The
subject of the present bill is the personal estate.
The court held that it had no, authority to set aside
the probate of a will, but that it might act in personam
to enjoin the beneficiaries from taking advantage thereof.
The court allowed the defendants a fortnight's time in
which to consent to revocation of the fraudulent probate,
and to propound a former valid will under which Powel
was also a beneficiary; or upon failure to do so within the
time allotted, both defendants should stand charged as
constructive trustees for the benefit of the plaintiff. The
court declared expressly that the mere fact that the will
was a forgery was not sufficient to justify equitable relief;
that it was the fraud involved in the probate of the will
that sustained the jurisdiction of the court.
Equity Jurisprudence, II, 418, sec. 919.
E.g. Seeds v. Seeds, 116 Ohio St. 144, 156 N. E. 193 (1927), where
"one of the inducements to probate was a forged proxy of the next of kin."
24
25
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The general principle enunciated in Barnesly v. Powel
is cited with approval in two leading United States
Court cases: Gaines v. Chew 6 and Broderick's
Supreme
27
Will.

The principle is therein restated, in the former

directly; in the latter, somewhat by implication.
The decision in Gaines v. Chew was handed down in
1844. The beneficiaries under a will executed in 1811 had
fraudulently suppressed a will executed in 1813, and
thereby obtained the probate of the earlier will. The
beneficiaries under the later will filed this bill against
the beneficiaries of the earlier will, praying to have them
declared trustees for the complainants' benefit, for an
accounting, and for general relief. The court sustained
the bill as a bill of discovery-several interrogatories
having been propounded-and retained jurisdiction to
see that relief was given. The court summarizes the
status of the bill:
In order that the complainants may have the means of making,
if they shall see fit, a formal application to the Probate Court,
for the proof of the last will and the revocation of the first,
having the answers of the executors, jurisdiction as to this
matter may be sustained. And, indeed, circumstances may arise,
on this part of the case, which shall require a more definite
and efficient action by the Circuit Court. For if the Probate
Court shall refuse to take jurisdiction, from a defect of power
to bring the parties before it, lapse of time, or any other ground,
and there shall be no remedy in the higher courts of the state,
it may become the duty of the Circuit Court, having the parties
before it, to require them to go before the Court of Probates,
and consent to the proof of the will of 1813 and the revocation
of that of 1811. And should this procedure fail to procure the
requisite action on both wills, it will be a matter for grave consideration, whether the inherent powers of a court of chancery
may not afford a remedy where the right is clear, by establishing the will of 1813.

In another part of the opinion the court uses the following language:
2643 U. S. (2 How.) 619, 11 L. Ed. 402 (1844).

2788 U. S. (21 Wall.) 503, 22 L. Ed. 599 (1874).
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If the fraud shall be established against the executors, and a
notice of the fraud by the other defendants, they must be-considered, though the sales have the forms of law, as holding the
property in trust for the complainants. .

.

. One man possesses

himself wrongfully and fraudulently of the property of another;
in equity, he holds such property in trust for the rightful owner.
Although the principle of Barnesly v. Powel appears
strictly as dictum in the case of Broderick's Will, the principle being nowhere positively stated, it permeates the
entire case and is constantly revealed by distinctions of
law and fact. The complainants were heirs at law of
the former Senator Broderick of California. They alleged that the will by virtue of which the defendants held
the property in question was a forgery, that the defendants took with notice of the forgery which was open and
notorious, that the complainants, because they lived in
a remote district were ignorant of the death of Broderick,
and consequently of the probate of the forged will, until
after the statutory period for contest had elapsed. The
court refused relief and dismissed the bill. The reasoning
of the decision is interesting, scholarly, in places somewhat tenuous, and replete with implications. The court
first reviews the English cases, including the decision
of the House of Lords in Kerrich v. Bra&sby and quotes
with approval from the California case of California v.
McGlynn. 8
Upon examining the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States, and of the courts of the several states, it will be
found that they have uniformly held that the principles established in England apply and govern cases arising under the
probate laws of this country; and that in the United States,
wherever the power to probate a will is given to a Probate or
Surrogate's court, the decree of such court is final and conclusive, and not subject, except on appeal to a higher court, to
be questioned in any other court, or be set aside or probated
by the court of chancery on any ground.
However, the effect of this apparently strong language
is substantially limited by the reasoning of the remainder
28 20

Cal. 233 (1862).
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of the decision and the application of the law to the facts
of the case. The court proceeds to discuss at some length
the decision of Gaines v. Chew, and dwells with especial
emphasis, upon the implications made in the conclusion of
the first paragraph heretofore quoted from that opinion.
The court dissents from nothing in the opinion of Gaines
v. Chew. Perhaps the most illuminating portion of the
opinion in Broderick's Will is the application of the law
to the facts. The following quotation is typical:
It needs no argument to show, as it is perfectly apparent, that
every objection to the will or the probate thereof could have
been raised, if it was not raised, in the Probate Court during
the proceedings instituted for proving the will, or at any time
within a year after probate was granted ....

What excuse have

they for not appearing in the Probate Court, for example?
None. No allegation is made that the notices were fraudulently
suppressed, or that the death of Broderick was fraudulently
concealed.
The implication here is clear that had there been fraud
collateral or extrinsic to the probate proceeding, such as
suppression of notices, or concealment of death, the court
might have assumed jurisdiction. The headnotes of the
case written by Mr. Justice Bradley, who wrote the opinion, make these implications explicit:
4. It seems that where the Courts of Probate have not jurisdiction, or where the period for its further exercise has expired,
and no laches are attributable to the injured party, courts of
equity will, without disturbing the operation of the will, interpose to give relief to parties injured by fraudulent or forged
wills, against those who are in possession of the decedent's estate,
or its proceeds mala fides, or without consideration.
5. But such relief will not be granted to parties who are in
laches, as where from ignorance of the testator's death they made
no effort to obtain relief until eight or nine years after the probate of his will.
The language of these headnotes has been adopted in
various state decisions as representing the rule of the
case, and cited with approval, notably in the Ohio
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Supreme Court case of Seeds v. Seeds.
Of the numerous state decisions supporting this principle, the Seeds case just mentioned and Caldwell v.
Taylor,0 are of especial interest.
The decision in Caldwell v. Taylor was rendered by the
California Supreme Court late in 1933. The petition was
filed for the purpose of charging the defendant as constructive trustee of property obtained under a will from
the complainant's father. The petition, to which a demurrer was sustained in the lower courts, alleged, in
substance, that the defendant, "a notorious woman who
had been arrested many times for grossly immoral acts
and for sundry misdemeanors and crimes," induced the
complainant's father, Perry Moore Caldwell, while in
an intoxicated and drugged condition to go through a
marriage ceremony in Mexico; that prior to the purported marriage she had falsely represented to him that
she was a single woman of good character and reputation; that after two weeks of cohabitation she induced
him to go to a hospital for treatment of incurable cancer
of the throat, from which he died two months later; that
during this time she "so harassed, urged, cajoled,
threatened, and nagged him" that he made the will in
question; that the defendant prevented the complainant's
visiting his father, but that the father did communicate
to the complainant suspicions regarding defendant and
a request to have her investigated; that prior to the probate of the will the complainant talked with the defendant and asked her directly what her name and marital
status were prior to the time of her purported marriage
to his father; that she represented to, him that she was,
on the day of said marriage, a widow, and that she had
never been known by any other name than Lenore Fisher;
that after the statutory period for contest of the will had
elapsed, he discovered her police record under the name
of Lenore Taylor, and that at the time of her purported
marriage she had a husband living; that the misstate29 116 Ohio St. 444, 156 N. E. 193, 52 A. L. R. 761 (1927).

80218 Cal. 471, 23 P. (2d) 758 (1933).
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ments with reference to her real identity and her marital
status were made by the defendant to the complainant
with the intent and purpose of preventing the complainant from presenting a contest of said will. In reversing
the judgment and ordering the lower court to overrule the
demurrer' the court said:
The jurisdiction of equity to afford appropriate relief from
judgments generally and from orders and decrees in probate
proceedings upon a showing of proper circumstances is well
settled. . . . It has been specifically held that equitable relief
may be granted against orders and decrees of a probate court,
including a decree of distribution, and a decree probating a will.
The decision in Seeds v. Seeds, was rendered by the
Ohio Supreme Court in 1927. The action was in equity,
to declare a trust ex maleficio, for an accounting, and for
further relief. In that case the petitioners were daughters of the principal defendant, James Seeds, and were
minors at the time of the events complained of. The petition alleged that on the day prior to the death of Estella
Seeds, mother of the petitioners and wife of principal
defendant, James Seeds, and one Ritter entered her room
at the hospital while she was unconscious, and, no one
being present in the room at the time except Seeds, Ritter, and the nurse, Seeds took her hand and made her
mark for her at the end of the purported will; that the
will was probated by the false and fraudulent testimony
of James Seeds, Ritter, and another; that service of
notice on the daughters was accepted by the defendant
James Seeds; that no contest was filed on said will; that
after his appointment as executor, Seeds misrepresented
to the court the nature and value of the estate, and
thereby obtained title to the same.
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Court
of Appeals which sustained judgment for the defendant.
In holding the defendants constructive trustees for the
benefit of the plaintiffs, after mentioning two statutory
remedies provided by the Ohio Code, the court said:
To these two remedies it is well settled that a third is added, viz.,
to declare a trust ex maleficio when the person who holds the
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legal title. has acquired the same by circumstances of fraud and
circumvention whereby the court has been defrauded and imposed upon, and in such a case equity becomes the artificial
conscience of the malefactor. Where a court has been induced by
fraud and imposition to enter a decree which would not have
been entered upon a full disclosure of fact, a court Will fasten
it upon the conscience of the owner of the legal title so as to
convert him into a trustee for the benefit of the parties who have
been defrauded and would have received the title under an honest disclosure of the facts.
To this, decision Mr. Justice Jones, with Mr. Justice
Matthias concurring, dissents, depending principally
upon the decision of Stowe v. Stowe,31 a Missouri case.
In that case, the plaintiff sought to charge the defendants
as trustees for the plaintiff's portion of his, father's
estate, on the grounds that his father's will, under which
the defendants claimed, was procured by fraud and imposition, and that the testator had not the mental capacity
to execute a will, and alleged that such will was admitted
to probate during the plaintiff's minority, and that he did
not learn of such facts and frauds until more than the
statutory period of five years after attaining his majority. In holding that equity was without jurisdiction, the
court said that
there has been one uniform course of decision in this state to
the effect that courts of equity, under our laws, have no jurisdiction to set aside wills for fraud, but that jurisdiction is vested
exclusively in the courts of law. The effort to confer jurisdiction
on the equity side of the court, is an attempt to accomplish
indirectly what the law will not permit to be done directly. The
attempt to charge defendants as trustees is predicated upon the
ground that Stowe's will was procured by fraud; that he was
imposed upon; that he had not the mental capacity to execute
a will. Each of these contentions was necessarily settled adversely to plaintiff by the probate of the will and the subsequent
lapse of time which rendered that probate a finality.
Stowe v. Stowe appears to be clearly contrary to Seeds v.
31 140 Mo. 594, 41 S. W. 951 (1897).
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Seeds. However, we shall see later whether it is actually
irreconcilable in principle.
Assuming that equity has power to give relief from
decrees of the probate court, under what circumstances,
or upon what showing of facts should the court exercise
such power? What, from a factual point of view, is the
principle which excepts those cases in which equitable
relief is justified from the operation of the general rule
that equity may not entertain jurisdiction of a bill to set
aside a will or probate thereof? The line of demarcation
between these two classes of decisions is clearly indicated in the case of Barnesly v. Powel immediately following a reference to the general rule laid down in
Kerrich v. Bransby:
But there is a material difference between this court's taking on
them to set aside a will of personal estate on account of fraud
or forgery in obtaining or making that will, and taking from
the party the benefit of a will established in the ecclesiastical
court by his fraud, not upon the testator, but upon the person
disinherited thereby, and claiming after the testator's death
against it.
The difference is between fraud in obtaining a will and
fraud in obtaining probate of a will. The fraud involved
in obtaining a will is germane and intrinsic to the probate
proceeding, and the finding of the probate court is, therefore, as to it res judicata. The fraud involved in obtaining the probate of a will is collateral and extrinsic, and
in no sense adjudicated by the probate court. It is in fact
a fraud upon the court itself.
Just what constitutes extrinsic as distinguished from
intrinsic fraud? The leading case upon the subject is
United States v. Throckmorton,32 a bill by the government to set aside the confirmations of certain Mexican
land grants. The general excellence and clarity of treatment of the principle there contained justify quoting at
some length from the opinion. Two of the headnotes,
written by Mr. Justice Miller, read as follows:
3298 U. S. 61, 25 L. Ed. 93 (1878).
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2. The frauds for which a bill in chancery will be sustained,
to set aside a judgment or decree between the same parties, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, are frauds extrinsic
or collateral to the matter tried by the first court and not a fraud

which was in issue in that suit.
3. The cases in which such relief has been granted are those in
which, by fraud or deception practiced on the unsuccessful party,
he has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by reason
of which there has never been a real contest before the court
of the subject-matter of the suit.

In the body of the opinion, the court cites as examples
of extrinsic fraud, the keeping of an opponent away from
court, a false promise of a compromise, keeping the defendant in ignorance of the suit, fraudulent assumption
by an attorney to represent a party for the purpose of
contriving at his defeat, and the "selling out" of a
client's interest by an attorney regularly employed.
From the innumerable state cases upon the general
subject of extrinsic fraud, a few illustrative ones may be
cited. In the Connecticut case of Pearce v. Olney,3 where
the plaintiff, after having promised to dismiss a suit
brought against the wrong party, nevertheless took judgment, equity gave relief. In Wierich v. De Zoya,"4 the
Illinois court of equity relieved a garnishee, who before
final judgment had paid over the fund to a third party
upon instructions of one of the parties garnishing. In
De Louis v. Meek,"5 the Iowa court granted relief where
an appearance had been entered by an attorney without
the party's consent. In Smith v. Lowry,386 the New York
3320 Conn. 544 (1850). Olney, known to Pearce to be acting as agent for
the Norwich Foundry Company, contracted to buy iron of Pearce. Pearce commenced suit against Olney on the contract and duly served him with process
in New York. Olney informed Pearce's attorney of the mistake and was
informed that no further action would be taken on the suit until notice was
given. The attorney appeared and took judgment against Olney. Later Pearce
brought debt against Olney in Connecticut on the judgment. Olney filed the
present bill to enjoin the action and the injunction was granted.
847 Ill. (2 Gilm.) 385 (1845).
The fund in this case was a promissory
note, of which defendant in the attachment was maker and McCormick payee.

The note had been endorsed by McCormick to one Sherill to whom payment
was made upon order of one of plaintiffs in the attachment.

352 Green (Iowa) 55 (1849).
36 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 320 (1814).
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court refused relief where, the defendant being prevented
from attending the trial because of public business, the
plaintiff obtained a larger verdict by reason of having
suborned a witness to perjury.
With the general distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud in mind, let us review briefly the cases considered earlier. In Barnesly v. Powel, Lord Hardwicke
particularly stressed the fact that relief was, granted, not
because of the forgery of the will but because of the
fraud involved in obtaining its probate. The relief in
Gaines v. Chew was granted not merely because a subsequent will had been overlooked, but rather because the
beneficiaries of the earlier will had actually suppressed
the later will, and had thereby practiced a fraud upon the
probate court, in that they represented to that court that
the will which they propounded was the last will and
testament, whereas they were actually cognizant of the
later will. In the case of Broderick's Will, the court refused to grant relief because there was no allegation of
extrinsic fraud. The court points out that the complainants offer nothing as a ground for equitable relief which
was not available in the hearing in the probate court,
and as to which, consequently, that hearing must be conclusive. What could be more eloquent than these words
of the court: "What excuse have they for not appearing
in the Probate Court for example.? None. No allegation
is made that the notices were fraudulently suppressed, or
that the death of Broderick was fraudulently concealed."
In Caldwell v. Taylor, the court expressly relied upon the
fraudulent misrepresentations of the defendant made to
the plaintiff subsequent to the death of plaintiff's father
as the basis for the relief granted. In Seeds v. Seeds, the
court stated that equity may "declare a trust ex maleficio
when the person who holds the legal title has acquired the
same by circumstances of fraud and circumvention
whereby the court has been defrauded and imposed
upon."1
Let us reconsider the apparently contrary decision of
Stowe v. Stowe in the light of the distinction between
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extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, and determine whether or
not the case can be reconciled to Seeds v. Seeds upon the
principle of that distinction. The similarity of facts is
striking. In Seeds v. Seeds the signature of the complainants' mother was forged by the complainants' father. In
Stowe v. Stowe the signature of the complainant's father
was obtained through the fraud. and imposition of the
complainant's stepmother. The complainants in both
cases were minors at the times of the events complained
of. The statutes in Ohio and Missouri were very similar,
both providing that the probate should be forever binding if not attacked within a given period, and saving a
like period to minors, after becoming of age. 7 In both
cases, the facts, were not discovered until after such
periods had elapsed. There is, however, one striking difference in the facts of the two cases, and that a vital one.
In Seeds v. Seeds, there was a fiduciary relationship between the complainants and the principal respondent,
their father. He was their natural guardian, under a
positive duty to protect their interests. He not only failed
to discharge this duty, but actually accepted service of
37 The Ohio statute, Gen. Code, sec. 10531, provides:

"If, within one year after probate bad, no person interested appears and
contests the validity of the will, the probate shall be forever binding, saving,
however, to infants, and persons of unsound mind, or in captivity, the like
period after the respective disabilities are removed."
The Missouri statute, Gen. Stat. Mo. 1865, p. 530, provides:
"Sec. 29. If any person interested in the probate of any will shall appear
within five years after the probate or rejection thereof, and by petition to the
circuit court of the county, contest the validity of the will, or pray to have a
will proved which has been rejected, an issue shall be made up, whether the
writing produced is the will of the testator or not, which shall be tried by a
jury, or if neither party require a jury, by the court.
"Sec. 30. The verdict of the jury, or the finding and judgment of the court,
shall be final, saving to the court the right of granting a new trial, as in other
cases, and to either party to appeal, in matters of law, to the supreme court.
"Sec. 31. If no person shall appear within the time aforesaid, the probate
or rejection of such will shall be binding, saving to infants, married women
or persons of unsound mind, a like period of five years after their respective
disabilities are removed."
Another ground of distinction between the iwo cases, and between Stowe v.
Stowe and other cases of the like in general, may lie in the unusual length of
the statutory period of contest, namely, five years. The language of the statute
is so strong and the period such as almost to constitute a limitation even upon
extrinsic fraud, and serve by analogy to define laches in equity. A rule refusing equitable relief under a five year statute would not be nearly so harsh as a
similar rule under a one year statute-or a six months statute as in California.
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process for them. The syllabus, written by the court,
reads in part:
Where the fraudulent beneficiary is the husband of the decedent and the father of the next of kin, he stands in a fiduciary
relation toward the next of kin, and this relationship imposes
upon him the legal duty to protect their interests, and by reason
of the violation of that duty he is created a trustee ex maleficio.
The breach of this fiduciary relationship constituted the
extrinsic fraud upon which the court based its relief.
In the case of Stowe v. Stowe, on the other hand, no
such fiduciary relationship existed, nor was there any
averment or suggestion of it in the complaint. There was
nowhere alleged in the entire bill any fact, act, or relationship which might constitute fraud collateral to the
probate proceedings themselves. The only suggestion of
the like was the bare statement that the defendants
"fraudulently" obtained the probate of the will. This
was at best a conclusion of law.
Mr. Joseph Warren, in a learned article upon the sub38
ject "Fraud, Undue Influence, and Mistake in Wills,"

comments briefly upon the principle of Barnesly v. Powel,
and concludes that it is no longer operative:
Lord Hardwicke said that equity had jurisdiction in the case of
a forged will, that is, where the fraud was not upon the testator
but upon the next of kin. But the case of Broderick's Will has
demonstrated the unsoundness of this view.
In the United States the early decisions in the state courts
show no influence of Barnesly v. Powel. Yet the influence of the
case flashed out for awhile in 1844 in Gaines v. Chew....
Thirty years later, in Broderick's Will, there was a bill in
equity to suppress a will, already probated, alleged to be forged.
The Supreme Court referred to much of the talk in Gaines v.
Chew as dicta, agreed in toto with the final decision in Allen v.
M'Pherson,3 9 said that in this case the probate court was entirely
38 41 Harv. L. Rev. 309 (1928). The section quoted is to be found on pages
314, 315, and 316.
39 1 H. L. Cas. 191, 9 Eng. Rep. 727 (1847). Allen v. M'Pherson is a leading
English case upon the subject of equitable relief for fraud in wills, but actually
does little more than affirm Kerrich v. Bransby. The gist of the facts and law
are set out in the syllabus:
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competent to do full justice among the parties, and dismissed the
bill.

However, the discussion of the cases. hereinbefore set
out, together with the later decisions in Seeds v. Seeds
and Caldwell v. Taylor, serve to refute Mr. Warren's
conclusion. The absence of early decisions in the state
courts showing the influence of Bacrnesly v. Powel is of
but slight probative force. It must be remembered that
Barnesly v. Powel offers an extraordinary remedy. Ordi-

nary relief is suggested by Perry:
If, however, a will is probated by accident or mistake, or the
probate is procured by fraud, the judgment may be reversed or
modified by proceedings in the same court in the nature of a
40
petition for a review or for a new trial.
"A testator by his will and codicils gave R. A. large bequests, which he
revoked by a final codicil, providing only a small weekly allowance for him
during his life. The will and all the codicils having been admitted to probate,
after litigation as to the last codicil in the Ecclesiastical Court, R. A. filed a
bill in Chancery alleging that the testator had executed the last codicil under
undue influence of the residuary legatee, and false representations made at her
instance respecting R. A.'s character; and that he had not been permitted in
the Ecclesiastical Court to take any objections to that codicil except such as
affected the validity of the whole instrument; the bill therefore prayed that
the executor or residuary legatee might be declared trustees or trustee for R. A.
to the amount of the revoked bequests.
"Held, on demurrer, that the Court of Chancery had no jurisdiction in the
matter (dissentientibus), Lord Cottenham (Chancellor) and Lord Langdale
(M. R.) and that the proper course would have been an appeal to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council against the sentence of the Ecclesiastical Court."
The actual holding is little more than that the complainant has mistaken
his remedy, which should have been an appeal from the probate proceedings
rather than a bill in equity. The fraud involved here is clearly intrinsic to the
probate proceedings; there is no allegation of any fraud subsequent to
testator's death.
Not even by way of dicta does the decision repudiate Barnesly v. Powel.
Lord Lyndhurst, giving the majority view, notes that nothing in that case is
contrary to the decision in the instant case:
"In the case of Barnesly v. Powel the probate was obtained by fraud, and
Lord Hardwicke drew the distinction to which I have already adverted, between a fraud on the testator and a fraud practiced after his death in obtaining
the probate. He thought, in the latter case, the court might declare the party
a trustee. This he said, was a ground of jurisdiction in the Court distinct
from the will itself. The distinction taken is decisive as to the opinion of Lord
Hardwicke, that in a case like the present-a case of alleged fraud practiced
upon the testator himself-the Court of Chancery could not take cognizance of
the matter and apply a remedy by means of a trust."
400op. Cit., sec. 182.
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The doctrine of Barnesly v. Powel is certainly not dictum in Gaines v. Chew. While it is true that the bill is
sustained as one for discovery, the retention of jurisdiction is for the sole and express purpose of seeing that
relief is given in respect to the will.
The characterization by the court in Broderick's Will
of the "later expressions" of Gaines v. Chew as dicta is
accurate as referring to the particular relief which the
court of equity may give. The significant point in the
case, and one which is in no sense dictum, is that the
court retained jurisdiction of the bill to give relief in
respect to the will beyond mere discovery.
Far from "demonstrating the unsoundness" of
Barnesly v. Powel, the court in Broderick's Will carefully
shows that its facts do not fall within the principle of that
case-that there is no collateral or extrinsic fraud-that
there was no suppression of notices or fraudulent concealment. Certainly the headnote statement of Mr. Justice
Bradley, who wrote the opinion, should be virtually conclusive in respect to the intention and understanding of
the court.
It is to be regretted that Mr. Warren did not have
Seeds v. Seeds and Caldwell v. Taylor before him as he
wrote. 41 Clearly the principle of Barnesly v. Powel is not
dead. In his entire article, Mr. Warren did not cite a single case-and the present writer confidently believes
there is none-where, in refusing equitable relief in the
presence of facts which might raise a presumption or suggestion of extrinsic fraud, the court has not expressly
rebutted such presumption.
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud
is the principle upon which all the cases can be reconciled. In the Washington case of Krohn v. Hirsch,4 the
court refused to give relief from a decree awarding all
the property to the defendant, who, claiming to be the
widow and sole heir of intestate, was appointed admin41 The rehearing in Seeds v. Seeds was denied in April of 1927. Mr. Warren's
article was published in January of 1928, but had evidently been written some
months earlier, since it takes no account of that case.
42 81 Wash. 222, 142 P. 647 (1914).
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istratrix of his estate, and, after having fully administered, duly petitioned the court to distribute the property remaining to her. Complainant was intestate's
sister, which fact, however, defendant had denied in communications between them. The court held that the testimony of the defendant that she was the rightful distributee was intrinsic to the probate proceedings, and so furnished no grounds for relief.43
In another Washington case, Davis v. Seavey,44 where
a final decree of distribution under a will had been made,
and the beneficiary under an alleged unprobated codicil
had not objected for the statutory period of one year,
the court refused relief to such beneficiary, stating that
to justify such relief the fraud alleged on the part of the
executrix must relate to preventing the claimant from
appearing and setting up her claim.
In the Utah case of Weyant v. Utah Savings and Trust
Company,45 where the plaintiff's husband had eloped with
another woman and lived under a fictitious name until his
death, and the other woman had secured appointment as
administratrix and probated his estate in the assumed
name under representation that she was his wife, and
thereby secured his property unknown to his real wife
and children, the court held that the fraud practiced by
the administratrix was extrinsic, and that equity would
grant relief.
In the California case of Sohler v. Sohler,4 6 where the
widow of the testator fraudulently represented to the
court that her son was also the testator's son, and thereby
obtained for him a share in property devised to the testator's children, who were infants and represented only
43 The court uses this language: "To us it is inconceivable that a party can
be considered as holding in trust for his adversary property which has been
awarded to him as against his adversary by a judgment rendered upon due
notice in a proceeding instituted and carried on for the very purpose of determining the claims of each as against the other, to the property involved, in
the absence of fraud, or some fact extrinsic of the merits of the controversy in
issue, such as would avoid such judgment."
44 95 Wash. 57, 163 P. 35, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 314 (1917).
45 54 Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A. L. R. 1119 (1919).
46 135 Cal. 323, 67 P. 282 (1902).
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by the executrix, the court held the son a trustee for the
benefit of the minor children rightly entitled.
Assuming that the court has jurisdiction, and that a
case justifying relief exists, what form should that relief
take? 'The question is one that goes to the fundamentals
of jurisdiction. The exclusiveness of the jurisdiction of
the probate court cannot be overemphasized. It is
primary and fundamental, and so treated by the courts.
From this exclusiveness of jurisdiction flows, one unescapable conclusion. The action of the court of equity
in relieving against decrees of the probate court must
be in the fullest sense in personam.47 The relief granted
must be such that it does not directly impair or impeach
the actual decree of the probate court,4" but treating the
decree as valid, so readjusts. the rights of the parties with
relation thereto that property will not be unconscionably
withheld or retained.4 9 The parties may be enjoined from
taking advantage of the decree of the probate court; the
parties may be compelled by action of the court of equity
to go before the probate court and perform certain acts,
such as consenting to revocation of or reopening of the
fraudulent probate proceedings; or the court may, without
disturbing the decree of the probate court, give additional
relief by way of declaring a constructive trust.
The cases already discussed fully sustain this position.
In Barnesly v. Powel, the court held that it had no jurisdiction to set aside the probate of a will, but that it might
enjoin the beneficiaries from taking advantage of it. It
will be recalled that there the court gave relief in the
alternative; the defendants might appear before the probate court and consent to the revocation of the probate of
the forged will, and propound the genuine will, or upon
47 Wonderly v. Lafayette County, 150 Mo. 635, 51 S. W. 745, 73 Am. St. Rep.
474, 45 L. R. A. 386 (1899). This was a bill filed in the state court to set
aside a judgment obtained by fraud in the Federal courts.
48 Gregory v. Ford, 14 Cal. 138, 73 Am. Dec. 639 (1859) ; Kilheffer v. Herr,
17 Serg. and R. (Pa.) 319, 17 Am. Dec. 658 (1828).
49 Eichoff v. Eichoff, 107 Cal. 42, 40 P. 24, 48 Am. St. Rep. 110 (1895);
Blight v. Tobin, 7 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 612, 18 Am. Dec. 219 (1828) ; Warren v.
Union Bank of Rochester, 157 N. Y. 259, 51 N. E. 1036, 68 Am. St. Rep. 777,
43 L. R. A. 256 (1898) ; 15 R. C. L. 726 and cases there cited.
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the passage of two weeks' time without such action having
been taken, they should stand charged as constructive
trustees for the benefit of the complainant.
It will be noted that in the case of Gaines v. Chew, in
discussing the retention of jurisdiction of the matter by
the Circuit Court, the Supreme Court suggested several
possible remedies in order, the exhaustion or ineffectiveness of earlier ones presumably requisite to the availability of later ones: First, reopening of proceedings in
the probate court; second, relief through higher state
courts; third, consent of the, parties to reopening the
probate under compulsion of the court of equity; fourth,
direct equitable relief-doubtless by means of constructive trust. This portion of Gaines v. Chew was quoted
with approval in Broderick's Will, and so presumptively
sanctioned. In Caldwell v. Taylor the court said:
Since the probate of a will is a matter exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the probate court equity may not set aside the
probate, but it may declare the beneficiary a trustee for those
who have been defrauded ....
And such character of relief is
common. The judgment, order, or decree from the effect of which
relief is sought cannot constitute a bar to equitable relief. A proceeding for equitable relief is not a collateral attack, and since
its sole aim and purpose is to avoid the effect of said judgment,
the doctrine of res adjudicata can have no application to such
judgment.50
In Seeds v. Seeds relief is given by way of constructive
trust. The court specifically repels any suggestion that
the relief constitutes an attack upon the decree of the
probate court as such:
This suit, not having been brought within the time limited, could
not be maintained as a will contest. It does not follow that,
because the effect of this suit, if successful, would result in a
50 The court uses language of the same
Trust Company, already cited: "It may
else in this opinion that this court is also
attacks like the one made in this case in
is made in the statement of facts, is a
collateral attack."

tenor in Weyant v. Utah Savings and
as well be stated here as anywhere
firmly committed to the doctrine that
the equity action, to which reference
direct as contradistinguished from a
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different course of devolution of the property, it must be regarded as a will contest.
In closing let us briefly summarize the law upon the
subject. In general, the jurisdiction of the probate court
is. exclusive, and equity has no power to relieve against
its decrees. An exception is made to this general rule in
the case of a decree obtained by means of extrinsic fraud.
Extrinsic fraud is some device, artifice, or deception practiced directly upon the unsuccessful party, whereby he
has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, and by
reason of which there has never been a real contest before
the court of the subject matter of the suit. Upon a showing of extrinsic fraud a court of equity may, without disturbing the decree of the probate court, give relief in
personam. This relief may take the form of enjoining
the parties from taking advantage of the decree, of compelling parties to resubmit the controversy to the probate
court, or of declaring parties constructive trustees of the
property acquired by the decree. Such relief does not
constitute a collateral attack, but is an additional direct
remedy.
In response to the objection to equitable relief against
a . final decree of the probate court expressed in the
maxim, Interest reipublicae, ut sit finis litiu-m, may we
make a final quotation from Seeds v. Seeds:
If it be said that the sanctity, the solemnity, and the finality of
judgments and decrees of the courts will thereby be destroyed,
it may be answered that fraud and imposition upon the courts
have always been grounds for setting aside their judgments and
decrees; that where decrees are entered by practice of fraud
and imposition upon the courts, whereby certain persons have
enriched themselves at the expense of others, it is the peculiar
province of a court of chancery to right the wrong. The only
protection to which the decrees and judgments of the courts are
entitled is to be found in the quantum and character of proof
which are necessary to be found in establishing a case of fraud
and imposition.

